A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL FOR REGIONAL PEST CONTROL ADOPTION by Ahouissoussi, Nicolas B.C.
A Principal-Agent Model for Regional
Pest Control Adoption
Nicolas B. C. Ahouissoussi’
Abstract
Investigating the underlying producer characteristics associated with regional pest control
adoption revealed an interesting proposition. Early adopting producers of firm-specific techniques
with characteristics including higher education, more specialized operations, and larger sized
business units are dissatisfied with a regional pest control technique. This study provides an
explanation of the proposition based on a principal-agent model, Empirical support for the
proposition is also presented by developing a multinomlal Iogit model for predicting producers’
dissatisfaction with boll weevil eradication.
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Regional pest control may mitigate
externalities associated with mobile pests and
pesticide drift with the resulting potential
enhancement of producers’ net returns. Special
cases of regional pest control are successful pest
eradication programs. In particular, focusing on the
cotton boll weevil eradication (BWE) program,
Ahouissoussi et al., Carl son et al., and Carlson and
Suguiyama provided evidence of success by
determining eradication significantly increased
producers’ net returns.
Previous literature assumed, if a program
increased net returns, producers would be satisfied
with this program and support its adoption
(Burrows; Rook and Carlson). However,
conventional theories describing technology
adoption in agriculture have addressed additional
adoption constraints associated with riskiness,
divisibility, substitutability, and availability, In
reality, even given producer subsidies for dealing
with these constraints, there still appears reluctance
for readily supporting BWE on the part of a
significant number of producers. This reluctance
has hampered the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) efforts in expanding the
program westward from the Carolinas.
Expansion requires a producer referendum
with two-thirds of the votes supporting BWE. Each
successful referendum obliges all cotton producers
participation in BWE and delegates APH IS
authority for uniform eradication activities on all
cotton grown within a prescribed area. Generally,
the first referendum falls short of the necessary two-
thirds approval; resulting in a great deal of effort on
the part of APHIS for insuring the second
referendum garnishes the necessary support for
passage. Producers resisting change and low voter
participation are given by APHIS as possible
explanations for weak first referendum results.
Investigating the underlying producer
characteristics associated with this resistance
revealed an interesting proposition. Early adopting
producers of new techniques with characteristics
summarized by Rogers including higher education,
more specialized operations, and larger sized
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business units were dissatisfied with BWE. An
explanation of the proposition is offered, in this
study, based on a principal-agent model. Empirical
support for the proposition is also presented by
developing a multlnomial Iogn model for predicting
producers’ dissatisfaction with BWE. Logit results
are then interpreted in light of the principal-agent
model. This interpretation indicates a different set
of producer characteristics are associated with
resistant producers for industry-specific technologies
Including BWE versus resistant producers for firm-
specific technologies say a new crop variety. The
implication of these results are important as BWE
expands further west. Knowledge of the
characteristics associated with dissatisfied producers
can be used by APEIIS personnel in the design of
information materials and incentives for supporting
BWE.
Principal-Agent Model
The principal, APHIS, is interested in
inducing a particular response from agents,
producers. The principal’s problem is designing an
incentive payment for this inducement. Let R,
represent the reduction of pests, say boll weevils,
from a crop associated with an agent of type i, For
convenience suppose there are only two types of
agents. A high-cost agent with a cost function
denoted as cJR) and a low-cost agent denoted as
C](R), where cJR) > c,(R). These costs are an
agent’s anticipated loss associated with the adoption
of a regional pest control program. They represent
a producer’s loss in economic rent by switching
from individual firm control of pest management
towards regional control. This loss is the total per
acre cost of regional pest control, r,(R), minus the
potential gain in rents as measured by potential
increases in yields and reduction in inputs from this
switch, n,, conditional on a given level of R
c,(R) = r,(R) - n,(AY,, AA,, ABI, AO,, AN, ] R), (1)
where A denotes change in the variable magnitude
resulting with administration of regional pest
control, and Y, represents crop yield per acre, A,
represents planted acreage in acres, Bi denotes
producers’ own per acre cost of controlling the
particular pest considered for regional control, O,
and N, represent other insect control costs in dollars
per acre and non-pest control costs per acre,
respectively. For those producers where c,(R) <0,
indicating regional control costs, r,, do not
completely offset the positive rents, n,, an incentive
payment is not required for their support of regional
control which negates the principal-agent problem.
However, the problems encountered with producer
referendums indicate c,(R) > 0 for a significant
number and type of producers. An incentive
scheme is then required for producer adoption.
These potential gain in rents from regional
control, n,, will vary across producers. Producers’
gain in rents from regional control will be relatively
less for those producers experiencing high economic
rents without regional control. Early adopting
producers of firm-specific pest-control technologies
may experience temporary higher rents without
regional control if these rents are not totally
dissipated by the costly early adoption and there is
a lag in imitating the technology (Tirole). Thus, for
these early adopting producers the potential gains
from regional pest control may be small resulting in
a higher cost of supporting regional pest control.
The high cost agents, C2(R), are associated with
these early adopting producers.
Let s be the producer payment (subsidy)
from APHIS required for producers supporting
regional contfol. Then agent i‘s utility function is
of the form s - c,(R). Generally, the principal has
limited information on the type of cost functions, so
a probability of n, is associated with a type i cost
function. The principal must design an incentive
scheme that does well on average whatever type of
agent is involved. Following Varian along with
normalizing the value of a per unit reduction in pest
control, the principal’s optimization problem is
max rclRl + rczR2- s,
R1’R2’~
such that
s - C,(RI) >0,
s - C2(R2)~ O,
CI(K)SCI(R 2)>
c2(R2) s c2(R1).
are the participate on The first two constraints
constraints. If the payment s does not cover the
switching costs, then the agent will not support the
regional program, The last two constraints are the
incentive compatibility constraints. The principal
must choose an incentive scheme where there is noJ. Agr, and Applied Econ July, 1995
benefit for an agent in having an alternative level of
pest reduction than the one preferred by the
principal.
The optimal actions of the principal maybe
determined by first considering the two incentive
compatibility constraints along with the assumption
C2(R) > CI(R) for all R. This yields
CI(RI) ~ CI(R2) < C2(R2),
C2(RJ s c2(R1) > c\(RI),
which imply CI(RI) ~ C2(R2). Given both
participation constraints, the principal wants s as
small as possible which corresponds with s = C2(R2).
For 100 percent agent support of regional control
the early adopting producers receive payments that
just makes them indifferent between supporting
regional control or not. Whereas, the other
producers potentially receive a surplus.
Generally, establishment of a mandatory
regional control program does not require 100
percent producer support. For example,
establishment of a BWE program requires support
of only two-thirds of voting producers within a
region. Thus, the set of constraints requiring all
agents’ willing participation may be relaxed, The
principal may then reduce the subsidy s and still
accomplish the objective of establishing regional
control. However, this results in a subset of
participation constraints not being satisfied,
implying some agents will be dissatisfied with
regional control. An example is the BWE program
where in many cases second referendums are
required. Specifically, in terms of the model, as s
is reduced towards CI(RI) the high-cost agents’
participation constraints are not satisfied, s - C2(R2)
<0, and thus they will no longer have an incentive
for supporting regional control, The association of
early adopting producers with high-cost agents
implies the following proposition:
Proposition 1, Producers with early
technology adoption characteristics will
generally be dissatisfied with regional pest
control programs.
Empirical support of this proposition is provided by
investigating the characteristics of cotton producers
who are dissatisfied with BWE,
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Empirical Application
Efforts for boosting support for BWE
involve a subsidy s in the form of offsetting
producer BWE program costs by requiring producer
payments of only 70 percent of total program costs,
Faced with this subsidy, cotton producers ascertain
their satisfaction, indifference, or dissatisfaction
with the proposed BWE program. Let y,, be a
binary variable for producer i, i = 1, ... T, that takes
the value one if the jth satisfaction level, j = 1, 2, 3,




Assume that producers maximize utility expressed
as
u,, = u, + e,, = x~fi, + e,,,
where X, is a vector of variables representing the
attributes of the ilk producer, 13Jis a vector of
unknown parameters which are alternative specific,
and e,, is a random disturbance reflecting
unobserved attributes of the satisfaction choice.
With DJalternative specific the explanatory vector
has differential impacts upon the odds of choosing
one alternative over another. Assuming that e,, are
independent random variables with a Weibull
distribution, then the probability of producer i
choosing satisfaction level j is
This is a general form of the logistic distribution
function (McFadden). The logarithm of the odds of
choosing satisfaction level j rather than alternative
level k, Q, k = 1, 2, 3) is
Normalizing on 13k,by setting 13k= O, uniquely
determines the selection probabilities.304 Ahouikous.si: A Principal-Agent Model for Regional Pesl Control Adop!ion
Assume producer satisfaction levels and
associated probability of selection are influenced by
producers’ expected change in rents, c,(R~), with and
without BWE and characteristics of an early
adopting producer. The term R: denotes the level
of pest reduction by producer of type i required for
eradication, This c,(R~) is represented by (I) where
the crop under consideration is cotton measured in
pounds of lint per acre and B, now denotes
producers’ own per acre cost of cotton boll weevil
control. For econometric analysis, the subsidy, s,
and total per acre cost of BWE, r, remain constant
over the time period considered, so they will not
influence producer satisfaction levels. Also, it is
assumed that AN, is measured by the management
decision unit dimensions Y,, A,, B,, and O,.
Setting satisfaction level monotonic with
the real numbers 1, 2, and 3, then it is anticipated
that producers experiencing a positive change in
yield and planted acreage would have a higher
satisfaction level and thus an associated positive
coefficient. Whereas, a positive change in boll
weevil and other insect control would be associated
with a negative coefficient. Assuming large acreage
producers benefit proportionately more from BWE
and producers with relatively higher pesticide costs,
both for boll weevil and other pests, would favor
BWE, then a positive sign is anticipated on the
coefficients associated with A,, B,, and 0,. The sign
associated with yield, Y,, is indeterminate. The
BWE satisfaction level of a relatively high yield
producer depends on the input mix.
Characteristics of early adopting producers
are measured by producer’s age, AGE,; educational
level, ED,; percentage of producer’s income coming
from farming, INC,; and number of years growing
cotton, YR,. Given Proposition 1, negative
coefficients associated with education and
percentage income from farming are anticipated.
Percentage income from farming is associated with
larger sized business units and less diversification,
two early adopting characteristics noted by Putler
and Zilberman, Rahm and Huffman, and Rogers.
Although Rogers concluded earlier adopters are not
different from later adopters in age, Batte e[ al.
found a significant negative relation with producers
adoption of computers. This negative relation may
be justified by the shorter time horizon older
producers have for reaping the long run benefits
associated with programs such as BWE. For years
growing cotton, YR,, the sign is indeterminate
(Dinar and Yaron). Producers may have remained
in cotton production for a long period because they
are early adopters or because of inertia behavior.
[n summary, Xi is a vector of the following
explanatory variables employed in a multinominal
logit model and estimated by the maximum
likelihood method
X, = (constant, Ay,, AA,, AB,, AO,, y,, A,, B,,
(+) (+) (-) (-) (’?) (+) (+)
O,, Age,, ED,, INC,, YR,),
(+) (-) (-) (-) (?)
with the anticipated signs in parentheses based on
Proposition I.
Data
Data were obtained on Georgia cotton
production practices detailing yields, acreage, and
insecticide applications before and after the
initiation of the BWE program along with data on
the characteristics of early adopting producers.
Telephone interviews spanning a five year period
from 1986 through 1990 were used for data
collection. For all of Georgia, except the
northwestern corner, after the first BWE referendum
failed the second referendum passed in 1986. The
BWE program was then started in 1987 with full
implementation by 1988. By 1990 the boll weevil
populations were severely depressed. Cases were
reported where prior populations levels of over 50
million boll weevils per 1000 acres resulted in only
three weevils being reported on the same acreage in
1990 (Lambert),
In the four survey years after 1986
producers in each year were asked if they were
satisfied with BWE, not satisfied, or indifferent.
These yearly satisfaction levels constitute the y,,
Vdriable. As hypothesized in the theoretical section,
changes in these satisfaction levels are influenced
by changes in yield, acreage, boll weevil control
costs, and other insect control costs. These changes
in determinants of net return are defined as yead y
deviations from year 1986. Year 1986 is pre-BWE
and serves as a benchmark year. For example, eachJ. Agr. and Applied Econ,, July, 1995 305
year following 1986, the change in yield, AY,,
variable consists of yield in that particular year
minus yield in the benchmark year. Similar
calculations were employed for determining changes
in acreage, boll weevil control costs, and other
insect control costs for each of the four years.
and the pseudo-R2 of 0,37 is within the range
typical for Iogit models. Percentage of correct
predictions is 84 percent which further supports the
reliability of the model.
Two coefficients significant at the five
percent level are opposite from the anticipated sign.
These coefficients are associated with the variables
Change in Boll Weevil Cost and Boll Weevil Cost.
Considering first the Change in Boll Weevil Cost
variable, the significant positive sign indicates that
producers are not relating a decline in their boll
weevil costs with an increase in BWE program
Results
The results from the multinominal Iogit
model based on 92 complete observations are
reported in table 1. The likelihood ratio test
indicates the model was significant at the 0.01 level
Table 1. Estimates of Log Odds of Producer Satisfaction With BWEa
Variable Anticipated Indifferent Satisfied Satisfied















































































(-1.67)”306 Ahoui.wou.w’ A Principal-Agenl Model for Regional Pest Control Adoptton
Table 1. Continued
Variable Anticipated Indifferent Satisfied Satisfied
Sign versus versus versus
Unsatisfied Unsatisfied Indifferent
Farm Incomec -1,378 -3.456 -2.077
(-0.70) (-2.08)” (-1.43)
Years in Cotton ? 0.500 0.791 0.291
(1.87)” (3.12)**” (1.99)’”
Log likelihood -37,358
Log likelihood restricted -59.361
Model chi-square 44.00”””
Pseudo R-square 0.37
Percent correctly classified 84.0
‘Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. A single, double, and triple asterisk indicates significance at the 0.10,
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively,
bEducationlevels were coded as 1 if completed 8th or less, 2 if had some high school, 3 if completed high
school, 4 had some college, 5 if completed college, and 6 had some type of post graduate education.
“Farm income levels are 1 if 10percent or less of income is from the farm, 2 between 11 and 25 percent,
3 between 26 and 75, and 4 if over 76.
satisfaction. Instead as their boll weevil costs rise
they might perceive greater importance of BWE and
thus increase their support. The unanticipated sign
on Boll Weevil Cost may bc investigated by
considering the characteristics or profile of a
producer who is dissatisfied with BWE. Such a
dissatisfied producer generally conforms with the
following profile: Full time producer who is older,
highly educated, recently entered cotton production,
and who intensively manages a low level of cotton
acreage by following a sterile field philosophy.
This dissatisfied producer also experienced a decline
in the change in yield and boll weevil costs and an
increase in the change in other insect costs. Sterile
field implies a relatively high level of boll weevil
control costs reiulting from insecticide applications
starting early in the growing season for the control
of boll weevils. Beneficial insects are then reduced
which no longer mitigates pest infestations.
Continued insecticide applications are thus required
throughout the remainder of a season.
This profile is generally characteristic of
an early adopting producer who may have recently
discovered potential economic rents in cotton
production. The producer has developed a
management practice that effectively controls pests
resulting in high yielding cotton. This management
practice may require intensive management
accounting for the low acreage or the producer may
bc limiting acreage initially until these potential
economic rents are confirmed.
Further evidence supporting this link
between dissatisfaction with BWE and early
adoption is provided by the partial derivatives
associated with the satisfied versus dissatisfied
estimates, table 2. The derivatives for education
and percent of farm income are approximately
double in magnitude compared with the other
derivatives. This indicates the strong influence
these early adoption variables exert on the
probability of an dissatisfied producer.J Agr. and Applied km,, JuIP, 199S 30’7
Table 2. Estimates of Percent Change in Asymptotic Probabilities’




















































devaluated at the mean value of the variables, this is the partial derivative of the logit model (Maddala, p.
23).
bEducationlevels were coded as 1ifcompleted 8[horiess, 2ifhadsome high school,3 ifcompleted high
school,4 had some college, 5 ifcompleted college, and6 had some type of post graduate education.
CFarmincome levels are 1 if 10percent orlessof income is from the farm, 2 between 11 and25 percent,
3 between 26 and 75. and 4 if over 76.
BWE is an industry program within a
region where the technology from the start impacts
all producers not just producers who are generally
early adopting. Thus, there is no incentive on the
part of early adopting producers in seizing a scarce
opportunity for investing. For technologies that are
firm-specific, the option of waiting will expire
because some competitor will seize the opportunity.
In this case, an early adopting producer WIII invest
as soon as the expected present value crosses zero.
[n contrast, for an early adopting producer
waiting has a positive value for an industry-specific
technology including BWE. Early adopting
producers which are reluctant in supporting BWE
may have invested considerable effort in
determining the least cost combination of inputs for
a given level of yield. This least cost combination
would require working out the complex matrix of
inputs for effective multiple pest control and the
mechanisms for addressing any changes in pest
dynamics. BWE, by removing one dimension in
this decision matrix, has the potential of reducing
this complexity. For example, cotton producers
reported only four pesticide applications in 1992 and
some fields were never treated while in 1986 the308 Ahoumwussl. A Principal-Agent Modeljor l/egionalPestControlAdop(ion
average number of applications for just boll weevil
numbered approximately 12 (Ahouissoussi et al,;
McPherson and Deuce). This reduction in
application number diminishes the complexity of
cotton management by restricting the number of
application decisions that a producer must make.
Thus, the competitive edge that an early adopting
producer may have is narrowed with application
restrictions imposed by BWE. This narrowing
implies that early adopting producers may find
positive value in not supporting BWE.
Considering supporters of BWE, results
indicate that part-time producers with limited
education are the dominant characteristics.
Producers with these characteristics see BWE as an
avenue for reducing their responsibility in making
complex management decisions. This shifting of
decisions may offset producer constraints associated
with lack of education and limited time for farm
management.
Implications
This analysis suggests a fundamental
difference in the type of producer who will early
adopt industry versus firm specific technologies.
For industry-specific technologies including regional
pest control such as BWE, producers with early
adopting characteristics for firm specific
technologies may delay their support of the
technology, The option of waiting has positive
value. Whereas, for firm-specific technologies this
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